Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to di¤erentiate himself from the more competent candidate? Recent works answer by the a¢ rmative (Groseclose 1999 , Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000 , Aragones and Pal-frey 2002 , 2003 . We consider a two candidates electoral competition over public consumption, with a two dimensional policy space and two dimensions of candidates heterogeneity. In this setting, we show that the conclusion depends on candidates relative competences over the two public goods and distinguish between two types of advantages (an absolute advantage and comparative advantage in providing the two public goods).
Introduction
Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to di¤erentiate himself from the more competent candidate?
Our objective is to answer these questions, and in so doing, to reexamine the results obtained in the recent literature on the competence of politicians. We consider a two candidates electoral competition over public consumption, with a two dimensional policy space and two dimensions of candidates heterogeneity. In this setting, we show that the conclusion depends on candidates relative competences over the two public goods and distinguish between two types of advantages (an absolute advantage and comparative advantage in providing the two public goods).
The closest works to this paper are Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) , Aragones and Palfrey (2002, 2003) , Groseclose (1999) . These papers focus on variations of the spatial model of election, introduced by Downs (1957) , where two candidates have to choose a position on the unit interval. In all these works, candidates have an unidimensional personal characteristic that determines their (dis)advantage. In these analyzes, voters utility is separable in policy and politician personal characteristic. They study the existence of the equilibrium and conclude that the advantaged candidate locates more centrally than the disadvantaged one. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) show that, in the absence of uncertainty, the advantaged candidate locates at the center, and that the disadvantaged candidate always loses and locates anywhere on the unit interval. As noticed by Aragones and Palfrey (2002) , the existence of equilibrium becomes a problem when there is uncertainty or when candidates maximize their share of votes. In this last case, the advantaged candidate always wants to choose the same program as the disadvantaged candidate to get all the votes, whereas the disadvantaged candidate has an incentive to di¤erentiate his platform in order to get at least some votes. Aragones and Palfrey (2002) examine the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in this electoral competition. They consider a discrete unit interval, and show that, when the advantage is small enough, the advantaged candidate chooses a probability distribution with a single peak in the center, whereas the disadvantaged candidate chooses a probability distribution with two peaks, one on each side of the center. In the present work, as in these two papers, voters utility function can be written as additively separable in policy and valence, but candidates scores on the valence dimension di¤ers among voters. If a candidate bene…ts from an absolute advantage, our results are close to Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) ; when an equilibrium exists, a candidate with an absolute advantage generally locates centrally, and the disadvantaged candidate locates anywhere in his policy set.
Groseclose (2001) and Aragones and Palfrey (2003) show that the existence problem can disappear when candidates have policy preferences. Groseclose (1999) shows that when candidates put su¢ ciently high weight on policy, a pure strategy equilibrium may exist and the advantaged candidate chooses a more moderate position than the disadvantaged candidate. Aragones and Palfrey (2003) consider two candidates who privately know their ideal point and their tradeo¤s between policy preferences and winning and show that a pure strategy equilibrium always exists. They also show that the result of Aragones and Palfrey (2002) is the limit case when policy preferences goes to zero.
One stream of the political economy literature, reviewed by Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 4, section 4.7), assumes that candidates di¤er in their ability to deliver services to citizens 1 . These papers investigate electoral accountability when voters have incomplete information on politicians. In our model, candidates di¤er in their competences but they are common knowledge.
Other scholars consider di¤erent asymmetries between the candidates 2 . Several analyzes show that Republican and Democrat have di¤erent e¤ects on the economy 3 , and study the impact of real or perceived economic perfor-mance on elections outcomes 4 . However, none of these papers considers candidates with a two dimensional competence. In section 2, we propose a political competition model where the candidates propose two public goods. The two opportunistic candidates have di¤erent competences to provide two public goods. They share the same beliefs on the median voter preferences and maximize their probability of winning. We de…ne two kinds of advantages in this model, the absolute advantage (one candidate is better in the provision of both goods) and the comparative advantage (each candidate is better in the provision of one of the two goods). In section 3, we focus on the case where one candidate has an absolute advantage; our results are similar to those of spatial valence models, that is, an equilibrium exists if and only if the advantage is large enough, the advantaged candidate wins with certainty, and he generally locates more centrally than the disadvantaged candidate. In section 4, we analyze the situation of comparative advantages; the results are sensibly different: candidates specialize in the provision of one of the public goods. We show that a pure strategy equilibrium generally exists. Finally, candidate's equilibrium probability of winning increases with the candidate competences. We then propose some discussions in section 5 and conclude in section 6
The model
The model is inspired by the "Multidimensional Public Consumption Model" introduced in Tabellini and Alesina (1990) . We …rst de…ne the two types of agents, voters and candidates: Voters: Let assume a population of voters of mass 1. The government provides two public goods, x 0 and y 0. Citizens disagree on the importance of the two public goods and citizen i's preferences are parametrized by the weight i 2 [0; 1] he places on public good x. If 1 < i < 0, his preferences 4 Fiorina (1981) and Austen-Smith and Banks (1989) assume that citizens vote retrospectively conditioned to the di¤erence between platforms and performance. Aragones (1997) surveys and contributes to the literature on the "negativity e¤ect" where voters vote on past performances and weight more negative than positive informations. See also Kernell (1977) , Lau (1982) , Klein (1991) , Abelson and Levi (1985) , Mueller (1973) , Bloom and Price (1975) , and Key (1966) .
are summarized in the following utility function:
If i = 0;
And, if i = 1;
These preferences belong to the set of intermediate preferences de…ned by Grandmont (1978) , and satisfy the single crossing property. Hence, a Condorcet winner exists and it is given by the preferred policy of the median voter m . Candidates: We consider two o¢ ce motivated candidates A and B. When a candidate is elected, he gets an exogenous ego-rent normalized to 1. In the seminal model of multidimensional public consumption, the two candidates have the same competencies to provide both public goods. And, when the government budget is …xed (as in our model), both candidates platforms converge to the median voter preferred policy. We relax this assumption and suppose that each candidate has di¤erent competencies associated to each public good. Candidates are heterogeneous on two dimensions. Let C x ; C y be candidate C competencies to provide x and y (for C = A; B). These competencies determine the candidates' e¢ ciency in providing each public good, and are inversely related to the cost of providing each public good. With these assumptions, candidates face di¤erent budget constraints when they are in power. We consider linear costs to provide both public goods and normalize the government budget to 1. Hence, if candidate C is elected, his budget constraint is given by 5 :
for C = A; B, with C x ; C y > 0 and x; y 0. Since we suppose that platforms must be credible and there is no debt, candidates have di¤erent policy sets. Let z C = x C ; y C denote one candidate C platform, C = A; B. Uncertainty: Candidates share the same beliefs over the distribution of voters. They suppose that F ( ) is the probability that m is lower than , i.e. F ( ) = Pr ( m ) for all 2 [0; 1]. Moreover, we suppose that the two candidates maximize their probability of winning. However, the model would be unchanged if we suppose that there is no uncertainty, F is the cumulative distribution of i on [0; 1] and the two candidates maximize their number/share of votes. Indeed, in both cases, the payo¤ function of candidate A is:
Remark that if we put all the competencies to 1, then the model is exactly identical to the multidimensional public consumption model. The policy set becomes unidimensional and there exists a unique equilibrium where both platforms converge to the expected median voter preferred program. Now we show that results are a¤ected when competencies di¤er among goods and candidates.
De…nitions
We de…ne absolute and comparative advantages in the context of public goods consumption. A candidate has an absolute advantage when he outperforms his opponent over the two policy dimensions. A natural de…nition of an absolute advantage is the following: De…nition 1 Candidate A has an absolute advantage on another candidate B to provide both public goods, if and only if We de…ne the comparative advantages situation where each candidate is relatively better than his opponent in providing one of the public goods. Formally, De…nition 2 Candidate A has a comparative advantage to provide x and B has a comparative advantage to provide y if and only if
Payo¤ functions
In this section, we derive the candidates payo¤ functions. Candidates maximize their probability of victory. i ln
Let b be the type of the voter indi¤erent between z A and z B :
We deduce from this expression:
Hence, candidate A gets votes from left (small i ) or votes from right (high i ), depending on the candidates'relative positions. Formally, if
If
And, if
y B y A < 1; candidate A's payo¤ is given by:
We now turn to the determination of equilibrium when one of the candidates has an absolute advantage.
3 Absolute advantage of one of the candidates
Equilibria
The situation of an absolute advantage is similar to the unidimensional spatial model when one candidate has a valence advantage, and our results are comparable to those of spatial models with uncertainty over the median voter preferences. When the advantage is small, as in spatial models 7 , there is no pure strategy equilibrium. The intuition of this result is the following. The advantaged candidate gets all votes when he imitates the disadvantaged candidate. Since the advantage is small, the disadvantaged candidate can di¤erentiate himself from the advantaged candidate and get a positive share of votes. There is thus no pure strategy equilibrium. Now, when the advantage is large enough, the advantaged candidate can provide large quantities of both public goods so that the disadvantaged candidate gets no vote, whatever his policy choice 8 :
Proposition 2 Suppose that A has an absolute advantage. If In this situation, the advantaged candidate is always certain to win the election, because he always provides more of both goods than the disadvantaged candidate. We now analyze the relation between absolute advantage and the symmetry of the electoral platform.
Absolute advantage and location on the policy space
In our context, we need to specify what we call a symmetric platform in the public goods consumption model. We suppose from now on that F is the cumulative of the uniform distribution on [0; 1].
2 is symmetric if and only if x = y:
Now, we de…ne the following order relation to compare candidates positions:
We call I (z) the position index of policy z. The more a platform is asymmetric, the higher the position index. We use this index to compare the candidates equilibrium platforms.
In the case where candidate A has an absolute advantage, these de…ni-tions do not allow to make a clear comparison, because of the multiplicity of equilibria. For example, suppose that . Hence z B0 is more symmetric than z A which is more symmetric than z B . We thus consider the average candidates equilibrium positions of the candidates. Let S C be the set of candidate C equilibrium platforms.
De…nition 5 If the equilibrium payo¤s are identical for every equilibrium, the set of candidate C'equilibrium platforms, S C , is said to be (weakly) generally more symmetric than the set of candidate C 0 'equilibrium platforms,
When a candidate has an absolute advantage, he always wins with probability 1; and his opponent always loses. Our de…nitions suppose that each candidate plays one of the equilibrium strategies with equal probability. We obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 If candidate A has an absolute advantage, the set of equilibrium platforms for candidate A is generally more symmetric than the set of equilibrium platforms for candidate B.
This result is similar to Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) . They show, in a unidimensional spatial model, that the set of equilibrium platforms is generally more central for the advantaged candidate than for the disadvantaged candidate. We focus now on the situation where candidates have comparative advantages.
Comparative advantage
In this section, we derive the unique equilibrium when candidates have comparative advantages, and provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for existence. , and the equilibrium platforms are:
Equilibrium
The intuition for the proof is as follows. Candidates cannot both choose platforms specializing in one of the public goods. If it were true, one of them would have an absolute advantage, and by the same reasoning as in the previous section, a pure strategy equilibrium may fail to exist. Candidates cannot specialize in the public good for which they don't have a comparative advantage, since they would then have an incentive to use their advantage and provide more of both good than their opponent. Hence, candidates must be specializing in the public good for which they have a comparative advantage.
However, when the comparative advantage of a candidate is not high enough, the other candidate may want to imitate it. As in the case of a small absolute advantage, one cannot guarantee existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. This leads to the following result (here, x ; y > 1 is always true). Figure 1 represents the area where a pure strategy equilibrium exists: We now present two comparative statics results on the equilibrium. First we show that a candidate who has a higher comparative advantage, obtains a higher payo¤.
Corollary 1 A candidate payo¤ increases with his comparative advantage:
However, we also obtain the less obvious result that, when candidate A becomes better at providing x; his equilibrium quantity of x does not necessarily increase:
Corollary 2 shows that an increase in a candidate's competence does not necessarily translate into an increase in the public good provision in the equilibrium platform. This result stems from two countervailing e¤ects. On the one hand, when A x increases, candidate A substitutes public good x to public good y (a substitution e¤ect). But, on the other hand, he has an incentive to increase his provision of public good y A (an income e¤ect which may dominate the substitution e¤ect).
Comparative advantage and platform symmetry
In this section, we provide a su¢ cient condition under which candidate B chooses a more symmetric platform than candidate A when both candidates have comparative advantages in one of the public goods (remember x = 
2
. Then B has more balanced competencies but his program is more asymmetric than candidate A's one.
Discussions
In this section, we discuss two points. The …rst remark highlights the link between our model and valence models. The second point we discuss relates to the voters utility function form.
Link with valence models
In valence models, there are two orthogonal dimensions, one being exogenous (valence) and the other being endogenous (policy). The log form of the voters utility function makes the model close to valence models. Recall that when C proposes z C = x C ; y C ; the platform must respect:
for C = A; B. To compare the public consumption model to valence models, we propose two variable changes. Let
denote the share invested in good x by candidate C, C = A; B. After this transformation, strategy s C belongs to [0; 1]. With the budget constraints, we can rede…ne voter i utility function as follows:
for C = A; B; u i s
9 . This is a non-spatial valence model. Indeed, voters utility functions are separable in the policy and valence dimensions. We will now consider the equivalent of the absolute advantage in a valence model. Say that a candidate has a Unanimity Valence Advantage (UVA) when all voters consider him best on the valence dimension: The following proposition con…rms the intuition that the UVA and the absolute advantage are, in our context (log utility), two similar de…nitions:
Proposition 7 Candidate A has a UVA if and only if he has an absolute advantage.
Note that this comparison is only possible because the voters utility functions have a log form.
Extension to other utility functions
Let consider a more general class of utility functions:
where G 0 ; H 0 > 0. It seems not possible to make the same comparison with valence models anymore. However, the results of propositions 1 to 3 still hold because the proofs only rely on the monotonicity of the utility functions and the budget constraints. It seems more di¢ cult to extend the results of the model when candidates have comparative advantages. Indeed, the proof of proposition 4 relies on the log-form since it allows to characterize the unique possible equilibrium. We can conjecture that (if an equilibrium exists) both candidates will still specialize. It seems di¢ cult to determine the situations where an equilibrium exists, since the payo¤ functions are not continuous. 9 Notice that C i may be negative. The important argument is the di¤erence between both candidates images 
Conclusion
We have shown that when candidates have two-dimensional competences, two kinds of advantages can be de…ned. When one the candidates has an absolute advantage, he generally adopts a more symmetric equilibrium platform than the disadvantaged candidate. The conclusion is ambiguous when the candidates have comparative advantages. Candidates provide di¤erent quantities of public goods and their probability of winning increases with their competencies. Furthermore, we have given necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a (unique) pure strategy equilibrium.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We distinguish two cases. Suppose ((x A ; y A ) ; (x B ; y B )) is an equilibrium: 
Proof of Proposition 2:
The proof is in two steps. In the …rst step, we show that the situations described in proposition 2 are equilibria. In the second step, we show that there is no other equilibrium. and y A y B ; 8y B 2 0; B y ; with at least one inequality being strict. Hence, candidate B cannot be strictly better. Furthermore, A gets the maximum payo¤, A = 1:
Step 2 : Now, let us show that ((x A ; y A ) ; (x B ; y B )) = ; ), the model is not modi…ed when the utility of voter i is given by: The indi¤erent voter is given by (if s C 6 = 0; 1; C = A; B):
where N s A ; s B = ln y + ln 
:
Proof of Lemma 1: Let x = and y = with 1 < . Then the inequality can be written as follows:
The di¤erentiate of h is h 
Proof of Proposition 7:
The necessary condition is straightforward: if Candidate A has an absolute advantage, then Regarding the su¢ cient condition, suppose that Candidate A has a UVA, then: Notice that for i = 0, the inequality becomes this is impossible.
